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submits this reply memorandum in further support of her Article

78 Petition to set aside the April 20, 2017 denial of her parole application by Respondent Parole
Board of New York, as arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Much like the Parole Board’s decision in this case, Respondent’s brief relies on the
articulation of generic legal principles to argue that so long as it utters a few “magic words,” its
discretion cannot be challenged and its decisions are unreviewable. At the same time,
Respondent argues that significant statutory reforms to make parole forward-looking had no
impact on its authority, and again claims that by merely mentioning that it looked at Ms.
objective, evidence-based COMPAS risk assessment, the Board need not give any credence or
effect to its conclusions.
Moreover, although it admits that Ms.

is entirely rehabilitated and poses no threat

to society, the Board nonetheless denied parole based solely on the seriousness of the crime
committed in 1981. Respondent now hopes to sustain that decision by arguing that because the
Board simply used the words “deprecate the seriousness of the offense” and “undermine respect
for the law,” its lack of analysis or meaningful consideration of the other statutory factors makes
no difference. That is not the law, and the Board’s improper decision should be vacated.
The Parole Board’s denial of Ms.
the Board continually denied Ms.

application for release is also unlawful because

access to the record of her case, to which she has an

undisputed statutory right. Respondent’s claims, that it is the wrong agency to provide the
record of its own proceedings, and that a narrow exception justifies the blanket withholding of all
documents, are overbroad and lack support in fact or law.

1
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Parole Board’s Denial of Ms.

Application Was An Abuse of Discretion

Although the Parole Board is granted significant discretion to carry out its duties, that
discretion is not unfettered; it must be exercised within the confines of the law. Respondent
argues that the mere mention of the required statutory factors satisfies this obligation and
insulates the Board’s decision from meaningful review. That is not the law.
A.

The Board Did Not Conduct The Forward-Looking Assessment Required By Law

The first basis for setting aside Respondent’s decision is that it is based on an error of
law. Parole decisions must be made based on a forward-looking assessment; who the parole
applicant is today—not who the person was when the crime was committed.
When the modern Parole Board was first established approximately 40 years ago, its
review focused on an evaluation of the nature of an offender’s crime and whether sufficient
punishment had been served.1 However, the Legislature amended the parole laws in 2011 (the
“2011 Amendments”), requiring the Board for the first time to include objective, evidence-based
assessments in its decision making. Respondent asserts (Memorandum of Law in Support of
Verified Answer and in Opposition to Petition (“Resp. Br.”) 11) that the 2011 Amendments were
minor, “technical changes” that had no impact on the Board’s discretion or the manner in which
it was required to make its decisions. That argument misconstrues the language of the 2011
Amendments, the clear legislative intent underlying them, and the decided cases.
Respondent also argues (Resp. Br. 12) that because the parole law still requires “a case1

When Executive Law § 259-i was first enacted, the Board was responsible for setting minimum periods of
imprisonment (“MPIs”) for inmates serving indeterminate sentences if a court had not already done so, in addition to
overseeing parole. 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 904 (enacting N.Y. Exec. Law former § 259-i(1)) (Add. 6). MPI was
decided solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense and the prior criminal record of the inmate—expressly
static and backwards-looking factors. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(1) (McKinney 1977). Although the Board stopped
making MPI determinations in the 1980s, the guidelines remained on the books until the 2011 amendments. See
N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (McKinney 2009); see also N.Y.C.R.R. § 8001.3(a) (regulations repealed by the
2011 Amendments stating that static sentencing grid “will be considered in each MPI and release decision”).

2
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by-case review of . . . the statutory factors,” the 2011 Amendments were largely meaningless.
This argument ignores the basic principle that when the Legislature enacts new legislation, it is
presumed to have intended to make a material change in the law. See In re Stein, 131 A.D.2d 68,
71-72 (2d Dep’t 1987). Moreover, Ms.

has never argued, as Respondent contends (Resp.

Br. 12), that the 2011 Amendments eliminated the need for individualized review; rather they
enhanced the need for truly individualized review, requiring the Parole Board to view each
offender as an individual in the context of his or her ability to re-enter society, not as a
manifestation of the crime the individual committed.
There are five other reasons for concluding that the 2011 Amendments mandate a
forward-looking assessment.
First, at the time of the bill’s 2011 passage, experts in the field, such as Columbia Law
School professor Philip Genty, wrote that the Amendments involved the “replacement of static,
past-focused ‘guidelines’ with more dynamic present and future-focused risk-assessment
‘procedures’ to guide the Parole Board,” which “has the potential to affect significantly the way
that the Parole Board conducts discretionary release determinations.” Philip M. Genty, Changes
to Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping Policy Shift, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 1, 2011.
Second, the Assembly’s Committee on Corrections has consistently made clear that those
Amendments were intended to fundamentally shift the law to effect a forward-looking approach.
Every edition of the Committee’s Annual Report since 2013 has referenced the need to improve
the Board’s decision-making and refocus its work on a forward-looking paradigm.2 See, e.g.,
2

Respondent asserts that “a risk and needs assessment is not even mentioned” in the 2011 Annual Report.
However, the report states that “[t]he budget legislation also includes a requirement that the Board establish new
written procedures for its use in making parole release decisions. These new guidelines will incorporate risk and
needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board and the likelihood of success of
such persons upon release.” See N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2011 Annual Report at 5 (2011) available
at http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2011Annual/report.pdf. While the 2010 Report did not explicitly mention
the legislation—it also did not mention the Parole Board merger with the Department of Corrections and

3
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N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2013 Annual Report at 3 (2016) available at
http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2016Annual/index.pdf (noting that the Parole Board
regulations in effect at the time “did not comply with the intent of the Legislature in that they
treated risk and needs principles enacted in 2011 as a mere factor in the decision-making process
rather than as the fundamental basis for release decisions”3 (Emphasis added.))4 Respondent’s
attempt to cast aside the opinion of the Assembly Committee is unavailing. The 2016 Report
and its predecessors reflect a clear frustration with the Board’s refusal to follow the mandate
created by the 2011 law, and provide a strong indication of how leading legislators viewed its
purpose and effect.
Third, comments of individual legislators demonstrate the forward-looking assessment
required by the 2011 Amendments. At a 2013 hearing on parole reform after adoption of the
2011 Amendments, Assembly Member Giglio stated that “[i]t was a mistake to leave it to the
Parole Board to [enact complying regulations] itself,” and that “with such bad faith and frankly,
unprofessional conduct, it seems to me that there’s a much bigger club that needs to be used to
Community Supervision (“DOCCS”)—it listed parole reform as a key issue to be addressed, “to evaluate whether
the practices and procedures in place today for both the Division of Parole and the Board of Parole are fair and
effective, and to make recommendations to improve future outcomes.” See N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr.,
2010 Annual Report at 14 (2010) available at http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2010Annual/index.pdf.
3

As noted in Ms
initial brief, the Board failed to draft regulations compliant with Executive Law for more
than five years after passage of the 2011 Amendments, and at least one court held that its refusal to do so violated
the law. See Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Article 78 Petition (“Pet’r Br.”) at 32, n.21 (citing
Morris v. N.Y. State. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Col. Cty. 2013), amended by
975 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct. Col. Cty. 2013)).

4

See also N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2013 Annual Report at 10 (2013) available at
http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2013Annual/index.pdf (discussing a hearing held to determine what changes
were necessary “to ensure that inmates who do not pose a public safety risk are released from prison in a timely and
rational fashion” and noting that the Committee will continue to encourage legislation to “permit increased parole of
inmates posing little risk to public safety”); N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2014 Annual Report at 14
(2014) available at http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2014Annual/index.pdf (noting that the Committee will
continue to advocate “to make sure that inmates who do not pose a public safety risk are released to community
supervision as quickly as possible”); N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2015 Annual Report at 16 (2015)
available at http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2015Annual/index.pdf (repeating sentiments from 2014 report
and adding advocacy for inmates “who are assessed as posing a low risk of recidivism” being released “unless the
Board identifies overriding factors militating against release that were not taken into account by such assessments”)
(emphasis added).

4
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reform [the parole] process . . . It’s not just about some procedures about how to use
COMPAS.”5 This statement directly rebuts Respondent’s argument that if the Legislature
intended to fundamentally change the law, it would have used stronger language. The
Legislature did think it had used strong enough language, it simply did not expect the Board to
do everything possible to sidestep its mandate.6 Respondent cites no countervailing legislative
history to indicate that such a shift was not intended to overcome the presumption of a material
change in the law. There is little question the 2011 law was meant to incorporate the forwardlooking idea of objective risks-and-needs principles throughout parole decision-making, not just
as a minor counterweight to the practice of denying parole based on the seriousness of a crime.
Fourth, numerous courts have recognized the fundamental shift required by the 2011
Amendments. Contrary to the cases relied upon Respondent which do little more than cite
general, pre-existing propositions of law, cases that have analyzed the intent underlying the 2011
Amendments have consistently favored Petitioner’s reading of the statute. See Mackenzie v.
Stanford, No. 2789/15, NYLJ 1202759023393, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Du. Cty. 2015) (the 2011
Amendments require the Board “to focus on an applicant’s rehabilitation and future rather than
giving undue weight to the crime of conviction and to the inmate’s pre-incarceration behavior”);
5

N.Y. State Assembly Standing Comm. on Corr., Testimony from Public Hearing, Board of Parole (hereinafter
“Committee Testimony”) at 173:10-16 (Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://nystateassembly.granicus.com/Document
Viewer.php?file=nystateassembly_fb550f4dc8b2cb99d203b3db32a36fb3.pdf.

6

Indeed, the Board itself seems to have recognized that its initial response to the 2011 Amendments was inadequate,
but remains determined to avoid changing its decision making process in any meaningful way. Immediately after
the Amendments were passed, the Board released only a memorandum from its counsel discussing the COMPAS
assessment and noting that risk-and-needs assessments should be considered. After courts divided on the propriety
of this response, the Board began the process of creating official regulations designed to encompass risk-and-needs
assessments. The Board adopted one set of regulations in 2014 (N.Y. St. Reg., vol. XXXVI, issue 30 at 11 (July 30,
2014)), which were widely viewed as inadequate, and updated those regulations in 2017—six years after the 2011
Amendments passed—to require that the Board provide a detailed explanation if it departs from a COMPAS
recommendation. 9 NYCRR §§ 8002.2-3 (eff. Sept. 27, 2017). From Respondent’s argument, (Resp. Br. 15) the
Board has adopted the position that such a departure occurs only when it specifically rejects the COMPAS’s
conclusion (e.g. believes the assessment is itself incorrect), not when it reaches a release decision inconsistent with
the objective, forward-thinking assessment. This approach appears specifically designed to undermine the
legislative mandate that the Board incorporate forward-thinking mechanisms into its decision making.

5
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Platten v. N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694, 699 (Sup. Ct. Sull. Cty. 2015) (“The changes
were intended to shift the focus of parole boards away from focusing on the severity or heinous
nature of the instant office, to a forward-thinking paradigm to evaluate whether an inmate is
rehabilitated and ready for release.”); Thwaites v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694, 699
(Sup. Ct. Or. Cty. 2011) (issued shortly after passage of the law, noting that the 2011
Amendments “are remedial in nature and designed to modernize decision-making in the area of
parole release”); see also People v. Brown, 25 N.Y.3d 247, 251 (2015) (observing that “the 2011
amendments were not purely budgetary or technical changes” because they “emphasized ‘the
evolution of the sentencing structure’ toward a ‘focus on reentry’”).
Fifth, the statute’s text and structure further support Petitioner’s view that the 2011
Amendments represented a fundamental shift in the way the Board is required to make decisions.
The Amendments, requiring that the Board consider risk-and-needs principles in every case,7
were codified in Executive Law § 259-c, which sets out the fundamental “functions, powers and
duties” of the Parole Board. Section 259-i, titled “Procedures for the conduct of the work of the
state board of parole,” which Respondent relies on for the proposition that it need not give any
deference to Ms.

risk assessment, merely sets forth the procedures by which those parole

duties are carried out. That section states that the factors the Board must consider are to be made
according to “the procedures adopted pursuant to [§ 259-c(4)].” Id. at § 259-i(2)(c)(A).
Had the Legislature merely wanted to make risk-and-needs principles another factor in
§ 259-i, it could have amended the § 259-i factors separately in the same bill. Yet, it chose to
place the language in the section outlining the fundamental powers and duties of the Board for a

7

Compare N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(4) (McKinney 2009) (the Board’s “written guidelines may consider the use of a
risk and needs assessment instrument” (emphasis added) with N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(4) (McKinney 2011) (the
Board’s “written procedures” “shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure” the rehabilitation standard
(emphasis added)).
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reason. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section, . . . it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.”). The most natural reading of the statute is that when making decisions, the Board
must exercise its discretion in line with its fundamental duties under the governing statute, § 259c—which requires the forward-looking risk and needs assessment. Regardless of whether this
statutory change mandates any particular result (see Resp. Br. 11-15), it demonstrates that the
Legislature believed risk-and-needs principles were an essential component of the Board’s
duties. At a minimum, it provides a lens through which all of the § 259-i factors must be viewed.
Contrary to Respondent’s overbroad contention, Petitioner’s argument is not, and never
has been, that the presence of a risk-and-needs assessment mandates a particular result.8 Rather,
it is that the 2011 Amendments were intended to create a paradigm shift in the Board’s approach
to its work so that it makes a forward-looking assessment of the parole applicant, and that a
decision—such as the one here—which recognizes an offender’s complete rehabilitation, but
casts it aside based on nothing more than the seriousness of the crime, fails to reflect adequate
consideration under the law, constituting an abuse of discretion.
Here, the distinction is dispositive. Respondent concedes (Resp. Br. 15) that, based on
her COMPAS assessment, “the Board did not find that there is a reasonable probability that
Petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.” Using a forwardlooking paradigm, there is no legitimate basis to deny parole. However, by maintaining its
position that parole decisions may be based entirely on factors tied to past behavior and a desire
8

Respondent cites to numerous cases for the proposition that the COMPAS assessment—one of the manifestations
of evidence-based risk-and-needs assessment—is only an “additional consideration” that the Board must consider
amongst other factors. See Resp. Br. 16. While those cases reflect an unduly restrictive reading of the law, they are
not inconsistent with Petitioner’s arguments that the 2011 Amendments change the Board’s fundamental analysis,
even if no particular result is required.
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for punishment, Respondent argues its decision cannot be set aside. Under the Board’s
approach, the Board could in every decision, no matter how rehabilitated a person was, state that
it did not depart from the COMPAS assessment but nonetheless render it meaningless by
denying parole. Although the Board has discretion, it may not subvert the will of the Legislature
to accomplish its own goals, as it seeks to do here.
B.

The Board’s Denial Unlawfully Relied on the Seriousness of Ms.

Crime

Wholly apart from its fundamental error of law, the Board’s denial of parole was
improper because the sole basis for its decision was the seriousness of Ms.

crime. This

is impermissible. It is black letter law in the First Department that “in order to preclude the
granting of parole exclusively on ‘the seriousness of the crime’ there must have been some
significantly aggravating or egregious circumstances surrounding the commission of the
particular crime.” King v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 431-33 (1st Dep’t 1993),
aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994); see also Matter of Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d
22, 27 (1st Dep’t 2016) (“The Board may not deny parole based solely on the seriousness of the
offense.”); other cases cited in Pet’r Br. 11.9
Respondent concedes that Ms.

is fully rehabilitated and presents no danger to

society. Resp. Br. 15. While in prison, Ms

has earned a Bachelors and a Masters degree,

has mentored and aided the rehabilitation of hundreds of prisoners, founded a nationally
replicated AIDS education program, become an expert in infant care and served in Bedford
Hills’ parenting center, and trained dogs to help both law enforcement and veterans, among
9

Notwithstanding this well-established law, parole denial based solely on the seriousness of the crime is a
longstanding practice of the Parole Board. Former Parole Board Chair Robert Dennison testified to the Assembly
that “if the Parole Board doesn’t like the crime, they’re not going to let you out. It doesn’t matter what else you’ve
accomplished, to be quite frank about it.” Committee Testimony (supra n.5) at 104:10-13. Another former Board
Commissioner, Thomas Grant, testified that the Board process was “broken,” in part because it typically engages in
a “static evaluation despite what all of the legislation has attempted to do,” because “they can do it. They can just
look at the instant offense and nothing else.” Id. at 128-30.
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many other accomplishments. See Verified Petition (“Ver. Pet.”) at ¶¶ 26-35. As Governor
Cuomo said when he granted Ms.

clemency, “I think the situation is corrected as it ever

going to be, unless you can bring a person back to life.” Ver. Pet. Exhibit 3 (hereinafter “Vol.
II”) at 386. In light of this record, what possible reason could there be to deny parole other than
the seriousness of the crime? And, under King, to deny parole based on the seriousness of the
crime there must be “aggravating circumstances,” which are nowhere referred to in the Parole
decision and in any event are not present.10
While Respondent makes much of the fact that the decision and the parole hearing
discuss other aspects of Ms.

application other than the crime itself, the record must

reflect more than mere references to other issues, it must show a qualitative assessment of the
factors to demonstrate that denial was based on more than the seriousness of a crime. See
Cappiello v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 6 Misc. 3d 1010(A), at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2004)
(Wetzel, J.). (“When the record of the Parole hearing fails to convincingly demonstrate that the
Parole Board . . . qualitatively weigh[ed] the relevant factors in light of the three statutorily
acceptable standards for denying parole release, the decision is arbitrary and capricious.”); see
also Ely v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, No. 100407/16, at 13-14 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Jan. 20, 2017)
(Jaffe, J.) (ordering de novo hearing where the Board, including Commissioner Ludlow,

10

Respondent’s brief (Resp. Br. 19), implicitly concedes the insufficiency of the Board’s decision, by attempting for
the first time in this proceeding to identify “aggravating factors” that were never mentioned by the Board or the
Appeals Unit. The law is clear that “judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to the grounds
invoked by the agency,” and courts may not “affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be
a more adequate or proper basis.” Madeiros v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 30 N.Y.3d 67, 74 (2017); Scherbyn v.
Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 N.Y.2d 753, 758 (1991).
In any event, Ms
crime—though terrible—has no aggravating factors, and Respondent’s two-sentence
attempt to manufacture them, unsupported by case law, would not revive an otherwise improper denial of parole.
Ms.
, a getaway driver in an armed robbery, who has fully accepted responsibility for her crimes, is a far cry
from the parole applicant in Phillips, the pre-2011 case on which Respondent relies. There, the petitioner was a
former police officer who abused his own authority while engaged in a long-term extortion plot and shot three
people himself, and whose “limited remorse” was found to actually deprecate the seriousness of his crime. See
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D. 3d 17, 22-24 (1st Dep’t 2007).
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discussed other aspects of application, but the decision reflected a “marked disinclination to
consider [Petitioner’s] achievements and other mitigating factors or explain how or why they are
outweighed by the severity of her crime.”).11 Here, even though the Board—or at least one
Commissioner—engaged in some discussion of Ms.

remorse and achievements, the clear

focus of the transcript and the entirety of the Board’s decision demonstrate an “overwhelming
emphasis” on the offense, rendering the decision improper. See Pulinario v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 42 Misc.3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2014) (Moulton, J.).
This lack of meaningful review is especially evident in the Board’s written decision. It is
no coincidence that Respondent is forced to rely heavily on quotes from the hearing transcript to
support its claims about the written decision’s sufficiency. See Resp. Br. 21. While the review
of a written decision’s adequacy may take the hearing into account, a review of this decision
demonstrates that the only basis for denial was the seriousness of the crime. The decision begins,
as most do, by reciting the boilerplate legal standard for parole. It then provides significant
detail about Ms.

crime, again focusing on who she was at the time of the crime rather

than who she is today. Next, the decision rotely lists some of Ms.

accomplishments and

parrots the materials reviewed. Only then does it list its bases for denying parole: statements
from others—presumably about the nature of Ms.

crime, entirely unidentified “additional

information” that Governor Cuomo supposedly lacked when granting Ms.

11

clemency, and

These are far from isolated decisions. In recent years, courts have begun exercising more exacting judicial review
over the Board’s improper practices, without unduly limiting its discretion. This is true at the appellate level, where
the First and Second Departments have regularly overturned Parole Board decisions that rely on the seriousness of
the crime. See Coleman v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 2017-07296, 2018 WL 343803, at *1
(2d Dep’t Jan. 10, 2018); Rossakis, 146 A.D.3d at 28; Ramirez v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 707, (2d Dep’t 2014); Huntley
v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945, 947 (2d Dep’t 2010); Johnson v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dep’t
2009); Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304, 307, (1st Dep’t 2005). It also includes cases from this Court and
numerous other Supreme Courts throughout the state. See e.g. Almonor, 16 Misc. 3d 1126(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.
2007) (York, J.); Rios v. N.Y State Div. of Parole, 15 Misc. 3d 1107(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2007) (Partnow, J.);
Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc. 3d 1009(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2005) (Kornreich, J.); Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 14 Misc. 3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bx. Cty. 2006); McBride v. Evans, 988 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. Du. Cty. 2014).
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status as a "symbol of violent an d teIToristic crime." App. 195-96. It closes by

Ms. telling Ms. -

that maybe, if she can convince more of the public to get on her side, she will

have a better chance for parole at her next hearing . Id.
To the extent that the decision purpo1is to be based on th e fact that Ms. -

release

would deprecate the seriousness of the offense or undennine respect for the law, nowhere does
th e decision explain why that is so oth er than because it was a serious crime. The decision and
transcript can be searched in vain for any basis for parole denial other than the seriousness of the
crime. Petitioner has spent m ore th an 36 years in prison (which Respondent refers to (Resp. Br.
18) as "only 36 years after the ... robbe1y " (emphasis added)), and is the th ird longest-serving
woman in a New York State prison . In addition, the Parole Board, as well as a President of the
United States, have paroled some participants in the Brinks robbe1y who were far more complicit
than Ms. -

and virtually all other pa1iicipants have been released (Vol. 2 at 614; Pet'r Br.

22, n.13). 12 It therefore defies explanation, notwithstanding Respondent's dismissal of the
argument as "nTelevant," th at releasing Ms. -

who represents the best of what an offender

can becom e, would somehow deprecate the seriousness of the crime or undennine respect for the
law. The law requii·es more, and th e B oard fell short of that in this case.

C.

The Parole B oard Improperly Relied on Generalized Community Opposition

Of the m any unlawful ways the Board relies on the seriousness of Ms. reliance on generalized community opposition to Ms. -

crime, its

release is paiiicularly problematic.

As a prelimina1y matter, there is no question that the B oai·d heavily based its decision on what it
12

Respondent's argument (Resp. Br. 27) that Kathy Boudin's release in 2002 demonstrates that this board could not
have been predisposed to deny Ms. application is entirely baseless. Neither of the commissioners who voted
to release Ms. Boudin remain on th ~
. See Beth Schwartzapefel, A Parole Heming in New York, With a
Governor 's Blessing This Time (Jan. 5, 201 7), available at https://wv.rw.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/05/a-parolehearing-in-new-york-with-a-govemor-s-blessing-this-time. While Ms. Boudin's release demonstrates that parole
may be granted without undennining respect for the law or deprecating the seriousness of the crime, it has no
bearing on the fe.elings of the commissioners who sat on Mspanel or the reasons for denial in this case.

11
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crime—it says as much in its

brief. See Resp. Br. 14 (discussing decision based on “public perceptions of the seriousness of a
crime”). Recent cases have held that this type of public opinion, which has nothing to do with
the offender’s risk to society and everything to do with the nature of the crime, cannot support
denying parole because it does nothing more than insert penal philosophy into what should be an
individualized release determination. See Ruzas v. Stanford, No. 1456/2016 (Sup. Ct. Du. Cty.
Jan. 30, 2017) (“Ruzas I”); Ely, at 13-14; Ramirez v. Stanford, No. 1928/2016 at 3 (Sup. Ct. Du.
Cty. Feb. 7, 2017) (“Ramirez”) (“As members of the parole board are not permitted to apply their
own penal philosophy in determining whether release is appropriate, it necessarily follows that
they may not deny parole release based upon letters from third parties expressing their penal
philosophies.”); Kinard v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, No. 217417 (Sup. Ct. Du. Cty. Jan 19, 2018)
(“Presumably, such individuals have no first-hand knowledge of facts relevant to the Parole
Board . . . .”) (attached hereto as Exhibit 1).13
Even courts that have read the law differently do not require a different result, as they
have made clear that even if the list of permissible communications which the Board can
consider is broader than those explicitly within the statute, generalized community opposition,
especially based on penal philosophy, is nonetheless improper. See Matter of Bottom v. Dep’t of
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 092448-17 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. Nov. 2, 2017) (“Bottom I”)
(“[A] non-individualized objection to the parole release of an individual because his or her crime
falls within a class of crimes would appear to be improper.”). Respondent’s two primary cases
are entirely inapposite to Ms.

. Matter of Grigger v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d

13

Respondent’s claim that the Board’s obligation to preserve the confidentiality of the names and addresses of
submissions means that it must be able to consider them lacks merit. “That section does not address or govern the
individuals who are authorized to provide information to the Parole Board with respect to a release application. It
addresses the confidentiality of identifying information provided to a Parole Board.” Kinard, No. 217417, at *4; see
also Pet’r Br. at 38-39.
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850, 852 (3d Dep’t 2004), leave denied 4 N.Y.3d 704 (2005) was about a letter from a District
Attorney, not generalized public opposition, and therefore has no bearing here. Matter of Bottom
v. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 092448-17 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. Jan. 10, 2018)
(“Bottom II”), which Respondent cites for the proposition that consideration of generalized penal
philosophy documents did not taint a parole denial, contains significantly different facts. In
Bottom II, the Court held that there was no evidence the Board had been influenced by the letters
it had received. Id. Here, the record here is replete with evidence the Board not only agreed
with the penal philosophy expressed by community opposition, but explicitly stated that its
decision was largely based upon it. The Board’s decision made no secret of the fact that it
believed Ms.

release was incompatible with the welfare of society as noted by

“thousands of its members, and because Ms.

is still a symbol of violent and terroristic

crime.” App. 196. The Board then strongly implied that the best way for Ms.

to achieve a

different result at her next appearance would be to try and make it so that not as many letters
expressing the same penal philosophy were submitted.
While Ms.

has not seen the documents, because the Board has refused to produce

them, see Part II, infra, it is highly unlikely that boilerplate letters from “thousands” of members
of the community, which convinced the Board that Ms.
on anything more than a belief that Ms.

is a “symbol” of crime, are based

deserves continued punishment because of who

she was in 1981 and what she did then. This clear reliance on inappropriate, generalized
community opposition expressing a penal philosophy is both improper by itself and additional
evidence of the Board’s unlawful decision based upon the seriousness of Ms.

crime.

If permitted, Respondent’s view turns parole into a popularity contest subject to political
whims, rather than an independent, objective evaluation of an applicant’s fitness for release. No

13
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matter how positive the risk assessment, if what the Board deems to be enough members of a
community, who have no knowledge of the offender’s extensive rehabilitation, sign a petition
objecting to her release the Parole Board can deny the application. That is not the law.
Additionally, Respondent asserts that Ms.

“cannot have it both ways” by asking the

Court to ignore generalized community opposition while she herself had many letters of support.
Resp. Br. 31. There is a categorical difference between the “boxes and boxes” of generalized
public opposition letters Respondent relied upon, which are discussed in the Board’s written
decision, and the hundreds of letters of support submitted on Petitioner’s behalf by people who
actually know Ms.

and have witnessed her transformation and accomplishments first hand,

which are not discussed. The authors of these letters include the long-time Superintendent of
Bedford Hills who believed Ms.

should have released in 2004, numerous public officials

and civic leaders, and dozens of others whose lives she has touched. Those letters speak directly
to the factors contained within the parole laws, warranting consideration by the Board.
D.

The Written Parole Decision Fails to Provide Sufficient Detail to Explain the
Board’s Decision

The Board’s written decision was also improper because it failed to explain the reasons
for denial of parole “in detail and not in conclusory terms.” N.Y. Exec. Law. 259-i(2)(a).
Though it need not discuss each factor in detail, a written decision “may not summarily itemize a
petitioner’s achievements while incarcerated or render a conclusory decision parroting the
statutory standard,” as happened here. See Ely, at 12; Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 14
Misc. 3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006) (rejecting “perfunctory” discussion of positive factors
because “actual consideration of factors means more than acknowledging that evidence of them
was before the Board”). The written decision itself must provide some basis from which a reader
can determine how the factors were weighed and why release was not warranted. See Coaxum,
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827 N.Y.S. 2d at 494 (“The decisionmaking is a process of determining which factors outweigh
others: a balancing process.”).
No matter how many times the Board’s decision is reviewed, the reader is still unable to
understand why, given Ms.

undisputed rehabilitation, parole was denied because “release

. . . is incompatible with the welfare of society . . . and that it would deprecate the seriousness of
the crime.” App. 192. Respondent cannot avoid its statutory responsibility solely by referencing
the hearing transcript and relying on the vague notion that the Board need not discuss each factor
in detail, which again willfully misconstrues Ms.

argument. As discussed in greater

detail in Ms.

initial brief (Pet’r Br. 24-28), the Board’s decision lists without discussion

some of Ms.

accomplishments and acknowledges her remorse, but provides no

information as to why those were insufficient. The absence of meaningful interaction between
the factors, not the number of words on the page, is what renders the decision improper.
E.

The Record As A Whole Demonstrates The Board’s Bias and Predetermination

There is no question that, upon a showing of evidence of bias by even one member of the
Board, the decision must be vacated and a de novo hearing granted. See Rios v. N.Y. State Div.
of Parole, 15 Misc. 3d 1107(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2007) (presence of a Board member for
whom denial is a foregone conclusion is sufficient to taint the entire proceeding); Rabenbauer v.
N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 46 Misc. 3d 603, 607 (Sup. Ct. Sul. Cty. 2014)
(commissioners may not base decisions on their own beliefs about the nature of the offense).
Here, a review of the full record shows that the Board predetermined the outcome of Ms.
hearing and had no intention of giving her an objective opportunity for release.
Although Ms.

initial brief gives repeated examples of statements by the Board

members demonstrating their animosity towards Ms.

and predetermination to deny her

parole (Pet’r Br. 11-16), it is telling that Respondent responded to only two of those statements.
15
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Resp. Br. 23-27. In any event the record is clear, as a review of the transcript thoroughly
demonstrates the nature and extent of that bias. Former Commissioner Ludlow, who was
subsequently held in contempt for his “administrative arrogance” and “contemptible” treatment
of parole applicants before him, see Ruzas v. Bd. of Parole, No. 1456/2016, at 9 (Sup. Ct. Du.
Cty. Oct. 18, 2017) (“Ruzas II”), went to great, and wholly unnecessary lengths to discuss the
details of Ms.
about Ms.

crime in a manner that betrayed his true opinion about the crime, and
. See Pet’r Br. 11-16, 28. There was no reason, for example, for Commissioner

Ludlow, to describe the crime with the words “terrorist swat team” or “slaughter,” no reason to
dwell on—and repeatedly return to—details of the crime in which Ms.

played absolutely

no role, and no reason to discuss his penal philosophy by comparing the idea of “mercy” on
parole to mercy for the victims of Ms.

crime. See id. All of which stands in stark

contrast to Commissioner Ludlow’s virtual silence when the discussion turned to Ms.

30

years of achievements, during which time he did not ask a single substantive question.14
Respondent’s argument that discussion of the crime allowed Ms.

to open up about her

remorse and facilitate a conversation does not come close to justifying the invective and colorful
language used by the Board in asking the questions.
F.

Denial of Parole Effectively Resentenced Ms

When the Parole Board uses its authority to impose its own belief about punishment, or
when a Board freely admits that no greater rehabilitation could be asked for, yet denies parole
anyway, it has effectively imposed its own sentence on the parole applicant. See Almonor v. N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole, 16 Misc. 3d 1126(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2007) (York, J.) That is what
happened here, and Respondent cannot avoid that conclusion by relying on the broad proposition
14

As noted in Ms.
initial brief, there is also a demonstrated basis supporting a finding that the other two
commissioners on the Board exhibited bias and predetermined the outcome. See Pet’r Br. 14-15.

16
23 of 32

RECEIVE6~hH!>UD~4 02/16/2018
th at th ere is no guaranteed right to parole. Ms .•

has been in prison for more than 36 years.

She has fully accepted responsibility for her actions, and spent the past three decades helping

thousands of people, both inside and out of prison. She has been granted clemency by the
Governor for th ose actions, an d Respondent freely admits that she poses no danger to society. It
is difficult to believe there is anything Ms .•

could say or do before her next scheduled

appearance th at would make any of the above less tiue.
At the same time, there is nothing Ms .•

can do to change the seriousness of her

crime or take back what she has done. In this case, the Board was paiiicularly ti·ansparent about
its intent, denying parole in lai·ge paii because of Ms -

supposed status as a symbol of

crime. App. 196. If the Boai·d did not believe parole was wairnnted after 36 years, nothing Ms .
•

can do before her next pai·ole hearing in April 2019 will change that fact. Thus, if the

Board 's detennination is upheld, it will effectively mean that Ms-

cannot possibly satisfy

th e Boai·d's interpretation of the pai·ole requirements, effectively resentencing her to life in
prison despite her clemency an d decades of positive works. This is improper, and cannot stand. 15
II.

The Board's Failure to Produce Documents Was Illegal and An Abuse of Discretion
Immediately after filing her administi·ative appeal, and as the parole law specifically

provides (9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8006 et seq.), Ms.- requested all documents in her parole record.
App. 208. The Board acknowledges Ms. -

entitlement to documents, as well as its

possession of an d capacity to produce them. See Resp. Br. 31, n. 10. It noneth eless asserts it
should not be ordered to produce them because (A) it is not the right entity to produce its own
documents, and (B) the documents fall under the Boai·d 's expansive definition of confidentiality.
15

Respondent cannot avoid this conclusion by arguing that it is only Ms. first appearance before the Board.
See Resp. Br. 22, 27. Additionally, Respondent's implication that those ~
ear before the Board for the first
time are somehow les s fit for parole because they have not sufficiently been through the process represents a
perversion of the parole process and is unlawful. An offender' s satisfaction of the requirements for parole has
nothing to do with the amount of time they have spent in prison~specially when that time is nearly four decades.
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Neither argument is supportable.
A.

The Board Has the Responsibility and Capability to Produce the Record

Respondent concedes that it was aware of Ms.

request for records, that the

request was properly filed, and that it in fact possesses the requested documents.16 Nevertheless,
it points the finger at DOCCS and disclaims all responsibility for the enforcement of its own
statutes. According to the Board, if Ms.

was dissatisfied with her non-receipt of the

documents, she should have: i) continued to demand them from DOCCS, ii) requested from the
Parole Board an extension of time to file her administrative appeal,17 iii) if still dissatisfied,
brought an Article 78 proceeding against DOCCS, iv) when that issue was resolved, return to the
Administrative Appeals Unit to perfect her parole appeal, and v) then, if necessary, brought an
Article 78 proceeding! Resp. Br. 39. That such a procedure would have meant that two years
would certainly have elapsed before this case could be heard—and by then Ms.

would be

entitled to a new parole hearing in any event18—apparently does not concern Respondent.
Not only is this argument frivolous, it cannot be squared with the statute, regulations, or
case law. New York Executive Law requires that “the chairman of the board of parole”—not
DOCCS—“maintain records of all parole interview and hearings” (N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(6)(b)
(emphasis added)) which is defined by the regulations to include those maintained by the
division [of parole] (9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8008.3 (“The term record or records means any
memorandum, document, tabulation or other writing . . . maintained by the division.”)).
Moreover, even if a DOCCS employees is responsible for fielding document requests, he is the
16

Respondent’s answer annexed for in camera review some of the very records Petitioner requested and also asked,
if it was in fact ordered to produce the requested records, to be given 30 days to produce them. Resp. Br. 31, n. 10.

17

Respondent’s repeated assurance that it would grant extensions of time to permit Ms.
to appeal the denial of
document production (see, e.g., Resp. Br. 39) misses the point: Ms.
does not want to extend her stay in prison
any longer than is necessary to overturn the Board’s abuse of authority.
18

An applicant denied parole is entitled to a new interview within two years. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(a).
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“employee designated by the chairman [of the Parole Board] to receive and respond to inquiries
for access to division of records.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8008.2 (emphasis added).
Moreover, DOCCS’ alleged assumption of duties to maintain documents in the Board’s
possession did not divest the Board of its responsibility under the statute. The amendments to
the Executive Law cited by Respondent neither deprive the Board of continued responsibility to
maintain documents nor take such documents out of the Board’s possession, it merely assigns
additional responsibility to DOCCS.19 2011 N.Y. Laws, ch. 62, Part C, Subpt. A., § 40. Indeed,
the current parole regulations expressly permit Parole Board officials—and those like them—to
make records available as they have done in the past. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8008.3 (the law “shall not
be construed to prohibit officials who have in the past been authorized to make records or
information available to the public from continuing to do so”). Notwithstanding the alleged
transfer, the Board continues to retain the right to “use,” “access,” and “make such entries as the
board of parole deems appropriate.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-k(1).
The Board’s contention that it is not authorized to disclose the requested documents
(Resp. Br. 37), is belied by the words of the statute and the decided cases. In Ruzas v. Stanford,
the Board was ordered to produce redacted versions of community opposition letters and was
able to do so in a short period of time. See Ruzas II, at 12; Ruzas I, at n. 1 (“The Court also
reviewed, in camera, confidential documents submitted by Respondent.”); see also People v.
Jones, 34 Misc.3d 1217(A) (Cty. Ct. Essex Cty. 2012) (“The report sought by the defendant here
19

In a similar context of federal Freedom of Information Act requests, courts have repeatedly held that agencies
cannot shirk their responsibility for processing document requests in their possession by claiming another agency is
responsible for those documents. See Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 248 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The agency cannot avoid the
request or withhold the documents by referring them back to the agency where they originated.”); Greenberg v. U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 18 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[E]ven though Customs referred these documents to other
agencies for review and processing, Customs is still responsible for explaining their non-production.”); Kennedy v.
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 03-CV-6076-CJS(FE), 2004 WL 2285058, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2004) (“Once
a FOIA request has been made to an agency, that agency's referral to a different agency regarding disclosure does
not divest the original agency of responsibility to respond to the FOIA request.”).
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already is, or should be, in the possession of the Parole Board and it is within the authority of the
Chairman to allow the defendant access to that report.” (emphasis added)).
Furthermore, Respondent’s position is contradicted by the requirement that a petitioner
raise the denial of access to the record in the Administrative Appeals process to preserve it for
review under Article 78. Wade v. Stanford, No. 522949, 2017 WL 1167761, at *1 (3d Dep’t
2017); Santos v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1059, 1060 (3d Dep’t 2011) (“Although petitioner further
asserts that he was denied access to confidential materials considered by the Board, he has not
preserved this claim for our review given his failure to raise it in his administrative appeal.”). If
the Appeals Unit or the Supreme Court had no authority to order the Parole Board to release
documents it supposedly does not have, that requirement would be completely superfluous.
Finally, Respondent’s position would undermine any meaningful right of appeal. It takes
up to eight months from the day notice of parole appeal is filed until the day an Article 78 may
be filed. By the time the Article 78 process on the documents is complete, the process must
begin anew on a parole appeal.20 Even a wholly successful Article 78 parole claim would likely
take longer than the period between statutorily mandated parole hearings. This puts petitioners
in a lose-lose situation: pursue the statutory right to their own record to conduct a fully informed
appeal, effectively eliminating any practical relief if successful, or roll the dice based on
20

Ms
experience is a perfect illustration of the problem with the Board’s view. Although Ms.
filed a
notice of appeal and requested the documents immediately following the Board’s decision (App. 208), production of
a “final response” was delayed for months by a litany of excuses, including bureaucratic error, vacation, and being
subject to additional scrutiny because her case was “high profile.” Vol. II at 104, 117-18. And that allegedly
completed “final response” was not final; after Ms.
counsel pointed out that additional document requests
were still outstanding—lack of production then being acknowledged to be an “oversight”—another response was
delivered declining to produce anything else. See App. 237-39; Vol II. at 1017-19. The Appeals Unit took nearly
four months—the maximum time it was allowed—to decide the case, and this proceeding was delayed by more than
a month at Respondent’s request, even though Ms.
counsel regularly communicated with the Attorney
General’s office during her appeal to avoid just such a delay. If Ms.
had pursued a separate Article 78 to
obtain the documents, this appeal would likely not be heard and resolved before she would be entitled to a new
hearing. Such an outcome completely undermines a meaningful right of appeal. See Kellogg v. N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 160366/2016, NYLJ 1202783795915, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., March 20, 2017) (Engoron, J.) (“Often,
[ordering a new interview] is meaningless, or close to it, because with the passage of time, the inmate would have
been entitled to a new hearing regardless.”).
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incomplete information and hope for the best. On the other hand, the Board is effectively
insulated from meaningful judicial review of its decisions.21 See Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 39 Misc. 3d 1213(A) (Sup. Ct. Col. Cty. 2013) (criticizing the Board
for encouraging delay to “shield[] it[self] from judicial scrutiny”).22
B.

The Board’s Overbroad Definition of Confidentiality Does Not Permit Denial of
Access To the Records

Apparently anticipating that its “ain’t my fault” excuse will be rejected, the Board next
argues Ms.

was not entitled to the documents in any event. It is undisputed that Ms.

properly requested, and is entitled to all records the Board considered in deciding her
application, subject only to a few specific carveouts, see 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2), which
must be read narrowly. Zuckerman v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 53 A.D.2d 405, 407-08 (3d Dep’t
1976) (“[S]tatutory exemption from disclosure must be narrowly construed to allow maximum
access.”). Though the documents Respondent declined to produce (which were virtually all of
the documents requested) were withheld in their entirety, the statute permits withholding only the
“name and address” of a letter’s author. N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(B).23 It does not permit
blanket denial of the records if they can be redacted. While Respondent claims its interpretation

21

In practice, it is invariably common for parole appeals to take so long that they are moot by the time any
meaningful relief is obtained. See Newton v. Dennison, 47 A.D.3d 538 (1st Dep’t 2008); Schwartz v. Dennison, 40
A.D.3d 218 (1st Dep’t 2007); Siao-Pao v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 150 (1st Dep’t 2004); Boddie v. New York State Div. of
Parole, 290 A.D.2d 327, (1st Dep’t 2002); Patterson v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 298 A.D.2d 254, 254 (1st Dep’t
2002); Feneque v. N.Y.State Div. of Parole, 252 A.D.2d 469, 471 (1st Dep’t 1998) (“In many ways, this procedural
impasse leads to a frustrating outcome for an appellate tribunal and, of course, far more so for petitioner himself.”).

22

Indeed, when Ms
counsel inquired why there was such a lengthy delay, the DOCCS Records Access
Officer blamed the Parole Board for not acting more quickly when it knew appeal would be taken. Vol. II at 117.
This blame-shifting on both sides underscores how difficult the Board makes appeal of its decisions.
23

Respondent states that letters were withheld pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2)(i)(a)(3), because they might
result in harm to a person. But that justification was never raised by the Administrative Appeal Unit (App. 205-06),
nor by DOCCS (App. 440 (invoking only 259-i(2)(c)(B)), and so should not be considered. See n.9, supra.
Respondent makes no effort to explain why individuals are in danger of being harmed, and cannot rely on the
theoretical possibility of harm to support a blanket record denial.
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is owed deference, Resp. Br. 43, n.14, the question is a matter of pure statutory interpretation,
and requires no “special competence or expertise.” Rho v. Ambach, 546 N.E.2d 188, 189 (1989)
(citation omitted). A court can easily interpret the term “name and address” as precluding
withholding of documents in their entirety. Resp. Br. 43, n.14.
Respondent attempts to circumvent this issue by asserting that the “name and address”
language of § 259-i(2)(c)(B)) must be read in conjunction with the parole regulation which
describes a goal to “permit private citizens to express freely their opinions for or against an
individual’s parole.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R § 8000.5(c)(2)(i). But this neither permits the Board to be
extraordinarily over-inclusive and withhold all documents, nor to treat a general goal described
in a regulation as overriding a specific statutory command. Perry Thompson Third Co. v. City of
New York, 279 A.D.2d 108, 115 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“An administrative agency . . . cannot extend
the meaning of the statutory language to apply to circumstances not intended to fall within the
statute.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Redacting the name and address does
not endanger the ability of people to freely express their opinions to the Board.
Respondent then attempts to justify its withholding of documents by asserting that
authors could be identified by virtue of writing style or personal information contained in the
submission, which could embarrass them. This reasoning was specifically rejected by the Third
Department in Legal Aid Soc’y of Ne. N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 195 A.D.2d
150, 153 (3d Dep’t 1993) (finding the idea that “an individual intent on discovering the
particulars” may be able to identify and “embarrass or harass the applicant or recipient” of the
requested determination to be “unpersuasive”). Here, Respondent offers no support for its
arbitrary speculation about what could happen if document access was provided. Moreover,
Respondent effectively contends that Ms.

is subject to less protection under the law

22
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because her parole application is the subject of media attention. See Resp. Br. 42. Theoretical
concerns, especially those that can be cured by additional redactions to specific documents if
necessaiy, cannot oveITide Ms. -

undisputed right of access to the documents that served

as a fundamental basis for the denial of her parole.
The Board argues that Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A D .2d 725 (3d Dep 't 1982) justifies
blanket withholding. It does not. That Comi never considered th e issue of providing redacted
letters, as Ms. -

seeks here. Moreover, there was no indication in Jordan that the Board

documents at issue played a significant impact in denying release. Here, "meaningful judicial
review" requires considering the letters' content "to detennine if the actions of the Board were,
in fact, in accordance with law." Collins v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733 (4th Dep't 1983).
Additionally, Jordan's reasoning is outdated because while it may have made sense at a time, the
advent of the internet, online petitions (which were undisputedly used here), and the ability for
lai·ge groups to mobilize against release with no real effo1i greatly minimize the risks of
providing redacted letters. Modem cases, like Ruzas, have reached the conclusion is that
redacted subinissions must be produced. Ruzas II, at 10 ("[S]ubrnissions to the Board "are not to
remain confidential. Rath er, only the names and addresses are to remain confidential, not th e
substance of the letters." (emphasis added)).
Failure to produce th e requested documents with redactions requires a de novo hearing.
When the Boai·d relies on inappropriate materials, its decision must be annulled.24 For instan ce,

24

Respondent fails to respond to the argument (Pet'r Br. 37, n. 24) that the list of letters in opposition and suppo1t
(App. 578-82) provided is incomplete, because it omits numerous letters Petitioner believes to have been submitted
to the Board on her behalf. Petitioner is entitled to review the record to ensure that all the documents of which she
was a.ware were in fact reviewed by the Board. To the extent the Board was not provided with or did not consider
all of the letters appropriately submitted on Ms. s behalf, especially from those who know her personally, the
Board's decision was improper and must be rev~
Smith v. N. Y. State Bd. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 1156, 1157 (3d
Dep't 2006) (reliance on en-oneous record wairnnts de novo interview); Hughes v. N. Y. State Div. ofParole, 21
A.D.3d 1176, 1177 (3d Dep't 2005) (same); Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800, 801, (3d Dep't 2004) (same).

23
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as noted supra at pp. 11-14, reliance on penal philosophy contained in the letters is inappropriate
and a basis to grant a de novo interview. Ramirez, at 3 (consideration of “letters from third
parties expressing their penal philosophies” “improperly injected penal philosophy in rendering
the challenged determination”); Ruzas I, at 5-6. Moreover, the Board’s violation of its own
regulations is itself a sufficient reason to warrant a de novo parole hearing. Andrews v. N.Y.
State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 400897/2014 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Jan. 13, 2015)
(Schlesinger, J.) (Board violated its rules by “denying Ms. Andrews access to records in her file
that were considered by the Board but not provided to her in whole or in part.”). Respondent
does not deny that the documents formed a key part of the reason to deny parole, nor could it,
given that the Board wrote that it was “persuaded” against release by the “boxes of opposition”
contained in the requested documents. App. 195-96. In addition, the Board claimed that Ms.
must convince unnamed parties that she was fit for release. App. 196. Moreover, the
Board distinguished its conclusion in denying parole from Governor Cuomo’s grant of clemency
on the basis of “substantial additional information” it had received by virtue of its “unique
process” beyond what was available to him. App. 196.25 Therefore, the content of the letters is
crucial to determining if the Board abused its authority.

25

Respondent’s argument that there is no due process interest in parole or her parole file, even if correct, is
immaterial, because there is a liberty interest implicated—and a new hearing owed—when an agency does not
follow its own regulations. Id.; cf. Rodriguez v. Greenfield, 7 Fed. App’x 42, 44 (2d Cir.2001) (unpublished)
(noting that there may be a “liberty or property interest in having the Parole Board comply with its own statutory
and regulatory guidelines in determining whether to grant or deny parole”); cf. Graziano v. Pataki, No. 06CIV0480
CLB, 2006 WL 2023082, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006) (“[T]his Court concludes as a matter of law that there is an
entitlement to a process of decision-making, which comports with the statutory guidelines of consideration to all
relevant statutory factors”).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the Parole Board’s denial of parole
and order an immediate de novo hearing before a new panel of Commissioners, with all
documents previously before the Parole Board immediately produced, and only identifying
names and addresses of the authors of those documents redacted.

New York, New York
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